Environmental Defense Institute

Troy, Idaho 83871-0220

 

 

November 25, 2003                                       

 

C. Stephen Allred, Director                                                                                                           

Idaho Department of Environmental Quality

1410 N. Hilton

Boise, ID  83706-1255

Sent via US Certified mail, and                                                                 

Sent via Email to: SALLRED@DEQ.STATE.ID.US

 

Kwai Chan, Assistant Inspector General

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Av.

Washington, DC 20460

Sent via Email to:  chan.kwai@epamail.epa.gov

                                                                       

 

L. John Iani, Administrator

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10

1200 Sixth Avenue  Mail Stop WCM-122

Seattle, WA 98101-1128

Sent via email to jhunt@epa.gov

 

 

Robert Bullock

Idaho Department of Environmental Quality

1410 N. Hilton

Boise, ID83706-1255

Sent via Email to: rbullock@deq.state.id.us

           

RE: Comments on Proposed Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Idaho Nuclear Technology and Environmental Center (INTEC) High-level Waste Tank Closure Plan for tank numbers (WM-184-185-186) approved by  Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) Docket Number 10HW-0314, EPA ID No. ID4890008952

 

Greetings,

                                   

            On July 11, 2003 the Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) and David McCoy sent you all  a petition to “Revoke INEEL INTEC tank closure permits” related to INTEC tanks WM-182 and 183 closure (Docket # 10HW-0204). The issues previously invoked  remain unresolved by the regulators.   On April 18, 2002  EDI and David McCoy sent you gentlemen a formal “request for investigation of the INEEL Tank Farm Closure Issues.”  Again, on May 28, 2002, EDI and McCoy sent a formal request to the Chair Person, Board of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality; August 8, 2003 Petition to Kwai Chan, Assistant Inspector General of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA/IG); and September 5, 2003 Comments on EPA Region 10 RCRA Final RCRA Enforcement Authority.  None of these formal request(s) apparently resulted in any substantive response to the essential issues of compliance with Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) or Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). EDI formally requests that these comments be added to our joint Petition to EPA/IG for an investigation of INEEL hazardous waste permits originally filed August 8, 2000. For a complete listing and access to these and related supplemental submittals see EDI’s website.

            Given the recent U.S. District Court judgement in NRDC vs. DOE,  Case No. 01-CV.413 (BLW), the HWMA/RCRA Partial Closure Plan Permit for Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Complex (INTEC) WM-182 and WM-183 and Closure Plan for WM-184, 185,  and 186 Tank Systems must be revoked.  In addition to Judge Winmill’s decision in the above cited case, we previously offered in formal submittals, NRDC’s August 22, 2002 legal analysis letter to DOJ/DOE to substantiate our request.  We note that the reason the NRDC suit was brought was to prevent precisely the type of tank closure that DOE proposed and which IDEQ has authorized. More recently, IDEQ approved a preliminary closure plan for three additional tanks, INTEC HLW tanks WM-184, 185, and 186 with notice in the Federal Register dated 11/14/03 (the subject of these comments). 

            Therefore, we again renew our formal request that the above permit(s) for INTEC HLW Tank Closures be revoked.   Judge Winmill’s Memorandum Decision states: “Thus, DOE’s Order 435.1 must be declared invalid under Chevron. The Court will therefore grant NRDC’s motion for summary judgement and deny DOE’s cross motion [for dismissal].” [page 12] Moreover, given Judge Winmill’s decision, the DOE’s INEEL High-level Waste Final Environmental Impact Statement (September 2002) must be considered inadequate and obsolete because most of the selected waste management operations are now by court order illegal.  Therefore the EIS must be updated and resubmitted for public comment.

            EDI acknowledges receipt of IDEQ letters (4/16/02) and (5/22/02) to EDI, however IDEQ chose to characterize these requests solely as “Public Information Requests” and categorically ignore the fundamental request of the tank closure permit request. Below is a review of DOE documentation on the contents of the subject INTEC HLW tank contents.

            Below is a table showing what limited information is available EDI only as a result of several  Public Information Requests to the State of Idaho, and not generally available to the public.

                        

Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center

 Tank Farm Facility High-level Waste

                                   

 

                [a] Where noted, these liquid volumes apparently include tank heels. [INEEL, Status and Path Forward for Treatment of INTEC Sodium-Bearing Waste, Joel Case and Keith Lochie DOE/ID 1/14/2003, presentation]

                [b]   DOE/EIS-0287D (1999) pages C.9-9 to 9-13. Total amount of residual radioactivity content decayed to 2016 levels for above tanks following disposition is 482,913 curies, believed to be grossly understated. See discussion below.  This tank heel is what DOE intends to leave behind after “performance-based closure or closure to landfill standards.”  This activity content information is considered understated by many orders of magnitude due to estimates based only “process knowledge” and not on direct sampling. [INEEL/EXT-01-00666, Rev.2 8/02, page 26].  As discussed below this figure may be understated by hundreds of thousands of gallons.

                [c] Undergoing closure under Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act/ Resource Conservation Recovery Act Closure Plan for INEEL/INTEC, DOE/ID-10802, December 20, 2002, and November 2001.

            [d] Where noted, these tanks contain cooling coils about two fee above the bottom of the tank to keep waste contents below 55 degrees centigrade (131 degrees F).  These cooling pipes add a significant complication to tank heel removal (see Attachment A). DOE refuses to commit to the specialized remote controlled high-pressure tank sluicing “arm”equipment needed to dislodge tank heels from piping and use of new dedicated pumps capable of  removing  tank heels. [DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00]

                [e] Idaho Department Environmental Quality approved closure plan for WM-182 & 183.  Preliminary closure plan approved by IDEQ for WM-184, 185, 186 to be finalized 12/03.

 

             State of Idaho INEEL Oversight Program Director, Kathleen Trever’s reported statements to the media that “Idaho’s agreement with the agency [IDEQ] says that if the department [DOE] can get the high-level waste out of the tanks by washing them and pumping the waste out, it can leave about an inch of slightly radioactive liquid in the tanks, fill the tanks with clean grout and leave them in place, Trever said.” [1] [emphasis added]  As discussed below, there is no credible basis for this claim. Moreover DOE intends (according to DOE INEEL HLW/EIS NEPA documentation) to mix high-activity (cesium and strontium) waste in the grout slated for the tanks (not “clean grout”) which is yet another apparent misrepresentation by Idaho to the public.

            The final INEEL HLW/EIS [2]  puts the INTEC HLW (high-level waste) tank heels at between 5,000 and 20,000 gallons per tank, and makes no commitment to exhume the tank heels, only liquids extractable using existing jet pumps located 9.5 inches above the tank floor. [DOE/EIS-0287 page 2-14] and [DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00, pg A-19] Given that all of the above eleven tanks are fifty feet in diameter, 9.5 inches of waste amounts to 11,620.3 gallons. [3]   At the DOE’s  upper limit of 20,000 gallons of heels in each of the eleven INTEC HLW tanks (a more reasonably conservative estimate), the total volume for all eleven tanks could be 220,000 gallons.  This conservative estimate of tank heel volume is especially pertinent given the presence of coolant coils in eight of the eleven Tank Farm HLW tanks that are about two feet above the bottom of the tanks. [4] See Attachment A “Construction Photo of HLW Tank Interior.”  Extraction of the ~ 29,400 gallons of tank heels in each tank or a total for the eight tanks with cooling coils of about 235,000 gallons without dedicated equipment capable of dislodging and exhuming the heels bound up in the cooling coils becomes extremely problematic.  Again, DOE has made no commitment for any dedicated heel extraction equipment only implementing existing jet pumps for the liquid contents above the 9.5 inch level.

            For general discussion purposes the eight INTEC HLW tank heel totals (with cooling coils) at ~ 235,000 gallons (29,400 times eight) and three tanks at 60,000 gallons each (20,000 times three) could leave potentially amount to about 295,000 gallons of high-level tank heels permanently in place under DOE’s tank closure plans. [5] 

            There are about 145 additional (not including the eleven Tank Farm units listed above) INTEC HLLW tanks (part of the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System ILWMS) with volume capacity of more than 440,000 gallons of waste that may also be left and grouted in place in DOE closure plans.  [EDI Tank List Report on INTEC Liquid Waste Management System, Rev, 13, 11/17/03]    To date, DOE has not disclosed any comprehensive assessment of these 145 additional tanks, or their liquid waste and heel volumes. There is however some limited information on the activity content of some operations.    For instance the New Waste Calcine Facility (NWCF) will retain 8,610 curies and the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) will retain 7,768 curies (decayed to 2016) after closure. [DOE/EIS-0287D (1999) pages C.9-9] Again, as discussed below, these figures are considered to be significantly understated.

            Idaho Department Environmental Quality (IDEQ) approved closure plan for WM-182 & 183 in July 2003.  Preliminary closure plan was approved (11/14/03) by IDEQ (Docket # 10HW-0314) for INTEC HLW tanks WM-184, 185, 186 that will be finalized 12/03. The same basic regulatory issues and alleged violations apply to both closure plans as discussed below.

            The completed closure of the Waste Calcine Facility at INTEC demonstrates how DOE is proceeding to close other operations (in addition to the Docket Number 10HW-0314, HLW tanks) by grouting them in place.  It must be noted that these (as well as the HLW tanks)  are not a Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) compliant “clean closure” but a negotiated “performance-based”  deal with the State of Idaho that would not otherwise meet regulatory requirements under RCRA or the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Also see alleged non-compliant closure of  INTEC SFE-20 tank closures containing HLW.

            Since INEEL started operations over five decades ago, “reprocessing of reactor fuel generated approximately 10 million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste, with more than 50 million curies of radioactivity.” [Affidavit of Kathleen Trever, State of Idaho Coordinator-Manager for INEEL Oversight, 3/24/03]      This represents a volume to activity relational rate of 1 to 5 (liquid to curie). [6]   If applied as a crude ball park to current activity level of the eleven INTEC HLW Tanks listed above would yield an activity curie content of about forty or fifty million curies, or many orders of magnitude more than what DOE and the State of Idaho are acknowledging to the general public.  If the radioactivity contained in the other 145 ancillary tanks in the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System, discussed above, is not appropriately included in the tank closure plan risk assessment for the whole INTEC site. This represents an enormous amount of radioactivity DOE and the state intend to leave permanently in a flood zone and above the Snake River Aquifer.  To put these radioactivity levels into perspective with respect to their deadly nature, EPA’s drinking water standards for these radionuclides are in units of pico curies per liter or one trillionth of one curie.                           

            Tank heels contain significantly higher radioactivity content than the liquid portion especially with respect to heavy long-lived transuranic elements like plutonium, uranium, and neptunium that tend to settle out into the tank heels.  DOE claims that the tanks undergoing closure do not contain high-level waste, yet up until 1997 they received first cycle raffinate which means the dominate tank heels will contain HLW. See Attachment B.   Moreover, the extensive ongoing use at INEEL of high-level liquid waste (HLLW) evaporators that burn off excess liquid containing volatile hazardous (i.e. mercury) and radioactive (i.e. tritium and C-14) portions of the waste to the atmosphere, means the current residual tank waste will have an even higher concentration of the non-volatile radioactive and hazardous waste constituents (ie. cadmium, chromium, and lead). [INEEL/EXT-01-0066 Rev 2, 8/02, page 44]

            Internal INEEL reports (see previous EDI submittals to EPA/IOG on internal INEEL reports on tank closure) confirm that grout when dumped into the tank does not mix with the residual tank waste, nor does it flow underneath the tank heels as DOE claims in its publications.  Additionally, grout dumped into the tank vault between the tank and concrete vault does not flow underneath the tank as DOE claims. Therefore, the waste Risk Calculation “fate-transport” model assumptions used by DOE to show impact of waste migration on Snake River Aquifer are not credible because (among other reasons) they do not include residual waste. [DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00, pg.  B-2]  Moreover, this inability to fully mix grout with the residual tank heel  waste and test the resulting mixture for homogeneity and resistence to waste leachate, is a violation of RCRA clean closure standards. [40 CFR 264.111 and 265.111] As previously discussed, long-half-life decay “daughter” products of radionuclides in the tank heels has not been included in the risk assessment. DOE can not claim a credible risk assessment without including the entire “decay chain” for each radionuclide contaminate.

            DOE/ID’s INTEC HLW tank closure plan includes “landfill” rationale. [DOE/ID-10841, December 2000]   This, in view of the recent Federal Court ruling in NRDC vs. DOE, is patently illegal. INTEC and the subject HLW tanks (the bottoms of which are some 40 feet below the flood level) are within the Big Lost River flood plain and therefore do not meet RCRA, NRC or NWPA criteria  as a permanent disposal site for high-level waste.

            Additionally, we request, in view of the court ruling, a review of the IDEQ INEEL INTEC tank closure permits  related to INTEC tanks WM-182 and 183 closure (Docket # 10HW-0204) and INTEC SFE-20 tank closure permit (Docket # 10HW-0203), and IDEQ Closure Permit for the INTEC Waste Calcine Facility [Docket # 10HW0305] and related tanks containing high-level waste as defined by the 7/3/03 U.S. District Court Decision that states in pertinent part: “... the solids sink to the bottom, forming a sludge, leaving the liquids on top.  This physical separation is analogous to the NWPA’s definition for separation: The liquid and solids are treated differently by the Act. While NWPA allows DOE to treat the solids to remove fission products, thereby permitting reclassification of the waste, NWPA does not offer the option of reclassification for liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing.” [page 10] Judge Winmill’s decision therefore applies to all INEEL tanks containing high-level waste. The wastes that are from reprocessing are not to be left in any of the tanks at INEEL and merely grouted. 

            We note that the NRDC vs DOE decision should be applied to the tanks (as previously noted) associated with the Waste Calcine Facility (“WCF”), the New Waste Calciner Facility (“NWCF”), including but not limited to the Calciner itself and the tanks for the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE), Liquid Effluent Treatment Disposal (LET&D),  and other INTEC Liquid Waste Management System tanks.  The contents of these tanks should be slated for RCRA clean closure and removal from the state of Idaho and not allowed to enter into the CERCLA process. 

  

Sincerely,

 

______________________________                       

Chuck Broscious, Executive Director

Environmental Defense Institute

P. O. Box 220

Troy, ID 83871-0220

208-835-6152

edinst@tds.net

 

Attachment A: (available by request but only provided in hard copy certified mailing)

            INEEL, Status and Path Forward for Treatment of INTEC Sodium-Bearing Waste, Joel Case and Keith Lochie DOE/ID 1/14/2003, Presentation to Snake River Alliance, Page 12 showing graphic depiction of eleven high-level waste tank contents (as of 12/31/02), and page 13 photo of HLW tank interior during construction showing cooling coils and relational effect of a man standing among the coolant coils. Available only in hard copy mailing not in email distribution.

 

Attachment B: (available by request but only provided in hard copy certified mailing)

            Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation Recovery Act Closure Plan for Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center Tanks WM-182 and WM-183, DOE/ID-10802, November 2001, page 7 and 8.

 

cc: sent via email to:

       Tom Patricelli, Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free Inc.

       Geoffrey Fettus, Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council

       Michael Owen, EPA/IG Seattle

       Jeff Hunt, EPA Region X

       David McCoy

       Teri Gregory, IDEQ

       Kathleen Trever, INEEL Oversight

       National/regional/local media

 

         ineel\iccp tanks\intec tank closure com2.final