Environmental Defense Institute

News on Environmental Health and Safety Issues

Unacceptable Risks at the INL Advanced Test Reactor

            The ongoing Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) analysis of documents gained through the Freedom of Information Act show more major safety system problems at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) forty-year-old Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). It must be noted that the Department of Energy (DOE) has censored the most crucial information on the grounds of "national security." Consequently, the public is again denied access to the whole extent of the risks possible at the ATR. [1]

            Clearly, there is a national security risk, but this risk is not propagated by "terrorists", but by the Bush Administration and its federal departments, agencies and surrogate Idaho State departments misguided program priorities that arbitrarily dismiss the public hazard.  Collectively we've got to cross our fingers that there are no earthquakes or other ATR system failures that would send radioactive emissions nearly half that emitted by Chernobyl.  Below are excerpts from the limited but more revealing documents EDI has received that are in addition to those posted in our last newsletters. 

            "The ATR firewater supply system is a multipurpose system.  One of the functions of the system is to supply water for the [Emergency Firewater Injection System] EFIS for [loss-of-coolant-accident] LOCA. The DOE contracted ABS consultants concluded the supports for the cation  and anion tanks in the ATR bypass demineralizer [part of the EFIS] system would not resist the loads generated by a design basis earthquake [DBE].  Failure of these supports could result in a more severe seismic LOCA at a higher frequency than addressed in the safety basis.  A plant modification was completed to adequately support the tanks for a design basis earthquake." 

            However, the DBE has since been revised upward to include the new seismic soil amplification factor of 2 times rock acceleration changing the ATR seismic Performance Category from PC-2 to a PC-4 and the new ATR Seismic Performance Criteria not considered in this modification.

            "The ABS consultants identified the supports for the PCS degassing tank (670-M-13) needed further evaluation. A previous analysis was reviewed and with the completion of additional analyses, it was concluded the supports would not resist the loads generated by a design basis earthquake.  Failure of these supports could result in a more severe seismic LOCA at a higher frequency than addressed in the safety basis (SE-2003-171).  A plant modification was completed to adequately support the tank for a design basis earthquake." [2]
            Again, the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) has since been revised upward to include the new seismic soil amplification factor of 2 times rock acceleration and not considered in this modification and what DOE's own managers call "crisis-mode approaches resulting in band-aid fixes rather than systematically evaluating the problems together and developing long term corrective action strategy to correct the noted deficiencies." [3]

            "As noted in SE-2003-126, the additional time delay [of the emergency firewater injection system] would worsen the consequences of two accidents discussed in the [upgraded final safety analysis report] UFSAR.  The Condition 3 (3-in diameter) LOCA with failure of the LOCA pump shutoff engineered safety feature (ESF) to trip all of the operating primary coolant pumps (PCP) (SAR-153) Section 15.6.5.2) and the Condition 4 (3-in. diameter) LOCA with failure of one PCP check valve (SAR-153 Section 15.6.5.4) were adversely affected." This refers to the ATR Safety Analysis Report SAR-153 Section 15 that DOE has denied under FOIA on national security grounds.

            "As reported in the [unreviewed safety question] USQ SE-2003-126, evaluation, the time delay in water injection could lead to complete draining of the surge tank for this event so the consequences of the event would be worse than presented in the safety basis.

            "The testing and modeling substantiated the basic concern of the USQ evaluation the [Emergency Firewater Injection] System could be over-taxed such that delivery rates to the reactor vessel were less than predicted…. For this seismic case, the total EFIS flow rate was only slightly above the acceptance criterion.  The operation of the feed water pump may adversely delay firewater pump starts since the bailey valve and feed water pump will attempt to maintain normal system pressure.

            "For the design-basis [loss-of-coolant-accident] LOCA with simultaneous fire suppression demand, the feed water pump is operating outside of the vendor pump curve [beyond pump rated capacity].  For the seismic case, both the 619-12 firewater pump and the feed water pump are assumed failed due to loss of AC power, and the overhead tank alone provides the flow rate. However, the inventory of the overhead tank is limited and the previously discussed issues concerning firewater pump start times are not completely resolved when only the overhead tank is modeled.

            "Collapse of masonry buildings could lead to fire suppression system piping failures outside the safety related boundary. Since TRA-670 is supported to bedrock, differential movement between the building and the underground piping could lead to piping failures.

            "The LOCA calculations supporting the ATR safety basis show that the EFIS flow rate is initially high 2,050 gallons per minute (gpm), but then decreases rapidly as the EFIS pressurizes the [primary coolant system] PCS.  Within one or two minutes the EFIS flow equilibrates such that the EFIS flow rate equals the break flow rate at a constant system pressure.  EFIS and break flows are typically less than 1,200 gpm for the current safety basis EFIS model with a source pressure of 63 psig at the firewater pump outlet.  With a source pressure about two times higher in pressure than currently assumed, the total EFIS flow rate would be expected to be less than the 1,800 gpm (total of both upper vessel and bottom head EFIS) after the flows and pressures stabilize,  With the total EFIS flow rate at 1,800 gpm the bottom head EFIS flow rate would be significantly less than the 1,600 gpm test flow rate." 

            In other words, even DOE's modeling show that a loss-of coolant accident (LOCA) will cause the reactor core temperature to rise ("thermal limits") with the result of steam pressure in the core that the EFIS will only be able to supply about half the required coolant water to the reactor core.

      "Similar to previous seismic LOCA analyses, [reactor core] thermal limits were approached twice during this event.  The first approach to limits occurred as the [primary coolant pump] PCPs coasted down (due to loss of AC power), and the second occurred after the DC power supply for the M-11 emergency coolant pump was depleted (30 min. into the accident), causing ECP M-11 to coast down." [4]

            Despite the revealing deficiencies quoted below, DOE (in classic DOE self-serving risk assessments) chose to ignore many fundamental system flaws from the assessment and issue an "acceptable" finding in its Interim Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Advanced Test Reactor that states:  "[T]he reactor makeup [coolant water] inventories would not support a 24 hour mission time, particularly for large or small [loss-of-coolant-accident] LOCA events.  Therefore, the fragility of commercial power was evaluated and commercial power is assumed to be non-recoverable for 72 hours if commercial power is lost.

            "As in the original seismic event tree, the 670-M-42 and 670-M-43 enterprise diesel generators are assumed to have a low seismic capacity and are not included in the model.  In this current model, the 674-M-6 diesel generator is not assumed to be capable of starting rapidly enough to support emergency pump operation following a seismic event, and long term running capability is severely limited by the TRA-776 fuel oil day-tank.  Therefore, currently the 674-M-6 diesel generator has not been included in the model."

            Systems having a high probability of failure are not included in the current seismic [probabilistic risk assessment] PRA model including the pressurizing pumps that are provided makeup from the [low-pressure demineralized water] LDW system, and the LDW purge system, which uses a valve with no preventive maintenance to assure the valve may be opened.

            "Other reactor scram parameters would occur following a significant ground motion, and do not provide the protection of [reactor] fuel thermal margins that the seismic reactor trip provides…. Failure of this function is assigned to plant damage state P4 [highest category].

            "ANSI/ANS-58.21-2003 discusses typical assumptions for LOSP events, that when commercial power is lost, it is assumed to be failed for 72 hours and not recoverable during this period….Failure of the [loss-of-coolant-accident / engineering safety features] LOCA ESF is assumed to result in surge tank draining and inadequate thermal margins [to reactor core]. Failure of the LOCA ESC is assumed to result in [reactor] fuel damage, and is delineated under plant damage state PLFD , the same plant damage state used for failure of emergency flow within 30 minutes." [emphasis added]

            " Emergency Firewater Injection (QFIS): The failure of the emergency firewater injection system within 2 hours of the event is modeled.  The fragility of the underground and above ground system is represented by the fragility of the overhead tank (see table 3, item 19).  This fragility is modified from the original fragility by adjusting for increased soil amplification.  Formerly, soil amplification above rock was a factor of 1.5, and is now approximately a factor of 2.0. Should masonry block buildings fail, damaging firewater sprinkler piping risers, and operator action would be required to isolate the ATR firewater loop from the RTC fire water loop."

            It is extremely significant that DOE is now acknowledging seismic soil amplification of 2.0 at the ATR and also reliance on "operator action" to mitigate is hugely problematic given documented lack of experience and training of ATR operators.  Reliance on an operator, in an accident situation, to go out side and unlock the boxes and close the valves needed to isolate the water system, us unrealistic. Also, engineers recognizing the ATR vulnerabilities forced DOE to reduce the ATR power level from 250 MW to 140 MW in an effort to mitigate the likelihood of an accident. If you're not worried you're not paying attention.

            "Failure of the [emergency firewater injection system] EFIS injection system within 2 hours of reactor shutdown would be an early [reactor] fuel damage event that may not meet Condition 4 ATR Protection Criteria." [emphasis added]

            "During reactor shutdown with the firewater system isolated by manual valves, firewater system makeup to the vessel cannot occur without opening the isolation valves manually.  The shutdown PRA in Thatcher et al. (1994) reviewed shutdown operations experience and found that 52% of shutdown operation with the reactor fueled had EFIS with manual isolation valves closed [when they should have been open].  If no [primary coolant system] PCS pipe break occurred, there would be several hours before the irradiated fuel could be uncovered. Operator response to open the isolation valves and actuate EFIS would have to be more rapid should pipe breaks occur, but would still allow more than 30 minutes for response."

            In more than half of the ATR shutdowns operators failed to open the EFIS valves, which is representative of how unreliable operator actions are to manually open remote valves and prevent a meltdown when other emergency systems fail.

            "Depending on firewater usage and isolation of no-essential demands, above-ground firewater inventory may be depleted after 2 hours. Operator action is required to start the backup diesel (if commercial power is lost), start the deep-well pump, isolate non-essential demands, and align a flow path from a deep-well to the reactor core or TRA-681 storage tank….There are 10 manual valves that are required to be manipulated…to avoid equipment failure."

            PRA model including the pressurizing pumps that are provided makeup from the [low-pressure demineralized water] LDW system, and the LDW purge system, which uses a valve with no preventive maintenance to assure the valve may be opened.

            "Current analyses for a seismic event with seismically-induced [primary coolant system] PCS leakage (or letdown flows due to open valves PCV-1-1 and LCV-1-3C indicate that for failures occurring on the ATR firewater loop, there may not be time to isolate firewater lines and EFIS supply to the reactor core may be insufficient to protect the core."  [5]

            Editor's note: it's a difficult decision on how best to present the above information. EDI decided that readers would prefer to see the actual document text rather than a dumbed-down polemic version, with limited credibility, so they can make their own informed decisions.  Your feedback on this would be greatly appreciated.

            The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the primary enforcement authority designated by statute and regulation to ensure that environmental laws are obeyed, and if not, levee fines and/or take the perpetrators to court.  Unfortunately, EPA administrators are Presidential political appointees that reflect the President's perspective on environmental enforcement.  EPA's enforcement is especially problematic when its own executive branch sister agencies are involved in violations. Enforcement is further diluted when EPA grants enforcement authority to states like Idaho where the DOE is the largest employer in the state and thus wields enormous political and economic power over the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. Consequently, public interest groups are forced to go to court because EPA or its surrogate state agency refused to exercise its enforcement authority despite monumental violations of the law.

            The U.S District Court was absolutely right when it said, "Where Department of Energy and its Secretary acknowledged that they had neither an Environmental Protection Act permit nor state permit for treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste, plaintiffs, environmental groups, were entitled to relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act."  [6]  "Deferral to the Environmental Protection Agency would not be appropriate."  [7]   

            EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance issued a ruling that dismissed EDI claims that INL was violating environmental laws. [8]  However, environmental law and court rulings show that DOE is only exempted from mixed waste under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) only by Presidential Order, or for "special nuclear material" (i.e., bomb grade plutonium/highly enriched uranium).  [9]

            "Over the past 60 years U.S. nuclear weapons facilities have generated some 100 million gallons of high-level waste (HLW).  This HLW sits in more that 200 underground storage tanks at three DOE sites: the Hanford Reservation in Washington, the Idaho National Laboratory (NL) and the SRS in South Carolina.  These sites are located near or adjacent to drinking water resources, including the Savannah River in South Carolina, the Snake River Aquifer in Idaho, and the Columbia River in Washington.  Over one million gallons of HLW have leaked from these storage tanks into the environment.  To address the need for long-term disposal of HLW (and the disposal of commercially generated spent nuclear fuel), on 1982 Congress passed the Nuclear Waste  Polity Act (NWPA) 42 U.S.C. ss 10101 et seq., which requires the DOE to dispose of this HLW in a deep, geologic repository."   [10]

            The U.S. Federal Court further dismisses the use of "Site-Wide" RCRA Part A & B Permit as adequate because, "every identifiable point that emits pollution is point source which must be authorized" and monitored for compliance "in accordance with limitations and conditions of the permit. "Whether several locations at nuclear defense plant were point sources for pollution was question [sic] within competence of courts, and accordingly, deferral to the Environmental Protection Agency would not be appropriate."    [11]

            As for the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the fact that NRDC v. DOE suit went all the way to Circuit Court of Appeals and then only dismissed (3/6/06) because DOE deliberately did not finalize its disposition for mixed high-level waste (HLW) says it all. [12] On 3 March 2006 the Court ruled "The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a brief describing various actions of the Department of Energy (DOE). [13]  However, none of those actions are final as required by the Ninth Circuit in this case.  If they become final, the NRDC retains the right to challenge them in a new lawsuit.  However this lawsuit is governed by the Ninth Circuit's decision that directed this Court to 'dismiss this action.'"  In other words, by deliberately delaying its final decision on how to dispose of its high-level waste, DOE is able to avoid a court ruling. 

            "The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the District Courts' decision, and put the legality of DOE's waste reclassification action off for another day. Contemporaneous with the Ninth Circuit's review of the Idaho Federal District Court's decision, DOE sought to have the District Court decision legislatively reversed by Congress. DOE succeeded in part with this effort in Section 3116 of the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act. This legislative reversal provides the Energy Secretary with the authority to make incidental waste determinations, for the most part long standards somewhat similar to those found in DOE's Order 435.1.  Congress granted DOE this reclassification authority in the states of South Carolina and Idaho but not in Washington."  [14]

            EPA refused to acknowledge spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipped to INL from numerous Navy yards on each coast, and the fact that SNF parts were dumped in the RWMC (INL burial grounds), [15] and the rest in cooling pools waiting decay, and interim "Independent Spent Fuel Storage Instillation" (ISFSI) at INTEC for final disposition in a deep geologic repository.  Plus SNF from TMI in Pennsylvania and Fort St. Verin in Colorado, Peach Bottom, and scores of foreign research reactor SNF (under the Non-proliferation treaty) ended up at INL. DOE's Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and INEL Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final EIS  describes how consolidation of SNF with stainless steel/zirconium cladding will be shipped to INL and aluminum clad SNF was shipped to Savannah River Site. Mixed waste generated by reprocessing SNF and/or processing for dry interim storage at INL ISFSI was not included in EPA's review. [16]

            The Clinton Administration shut down all SNF reprocessing in 1992, however DOE recently indicated their intent to restart limited reprocessing.  Only a small percentage of the "high-value" SNF at INL would be candidate for reprocessing, which means all the rest of SNF is mixed high-level radioactive waste requiring treatment, storage and disposal.  EPA simply ignores this reality.

            EPA incorrectly accepts DOE's claim that waste water is not discharged to waters of the US, because the "Clean Water Act extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves waters of United States.  [17]

            INL Advanced Test Reactor and Reactor Technology Complex (formerly Test Reactor Area) and Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) waste water discharge to unlined percolation ponds allow ATR/INTEC contaminants to migrate to EPA’s designated Idaho sole source Snake River Plain Aquifer that then discharges to the Snake River. EPA denial of "publicly owned treatment works" (POTW) and "federally owned treatment works" (FOTW) and exemption to National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) is also incorrect because of the above argument on the connection between the aquifer that supplies near total flow west of American Falls to  the Snake River due to dam diversion for irrigation. [18]

            Everything at INL slips neatly through the cracks including the lack of a RCRA permit for the ATR which is a generator of hazardous waste.  INL has been real quiet on this.  The cooperation of IDEQ, DOE and EPA to keep everything running as normal without following the law was the main reason EDI and Dave McCoy filed a petition to withhold EPA authorization of IDEQ as the hazardous waste management surrogate for EPA.  The lack of IDEQ follow through on permits is a good reason to resurrect this issue.  Also, IDEQ and EPA never offered an answer on whether IDEQ complied with the EPA Inspector General's demands set forth in their finding to our petition for withdrawal of IDEQ.  The game is to just let everything slide on a time basis and hope all the problems will go away and the environmentalists will walk away in frustration. 

            Associated Press reports 2/23/05,  "U.S. and British government scientists performed an underground  nuclear experiment, short of a nuclear blast, at the Nevada Test Site this week, the National Nuclear Security Administration said.
            "The experiment involved detonating high explosives around radioactive material in a vault about 1,000 feet below ground at a remote part of the desert testing range 85 miles northwest of Las Vegas.
            "No radioactivity was released in the subcritical experiment, said Nancy Tufano, spokeswoman for Bechtel Nevada, a contractor at the nuclear security administration in North Las Vegas. Scientists for the first time posted a nearly eight-minute video Web log of preparations for the experiment.
            "Tufano described the material tested as specially processed nuclear plutonium, but said she could not disclose the isotope for security reasons.  The test was designed to examine the effects of the explosion on the nuclear material. It was the 22nd subcritical test at the site since 1997.
            "Anti-nuclear groups criticize the subcritical experiments as contrary to the spirit of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear arms. The U.S. has observed a moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing since 1992, but has not ratified the treaty. Federal officials call subcritical experiments essential to maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal."
            This renewed testing is the early stages of DOE development of a new generation of "tactical" nuclear weapons called Deep Earth Penetraters or "Bunker Busters" that U.S. officials acknowledge may be used in preemptive strikes against non-nuclear nations.   The Union of Concerned Scientists did extensive analysis of the radiation that would be expected to be released from Bunker Busters.  Since the bombs do not penetrate very far into the ground, extensive radioactive fallout is released to the atmosphere.  See www.ucsusa.org  The U.S. and British hypocritical double standard is all the more poignant when they condemn other countries for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty while we develop new nuclear bombs in direct violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

            Janet Monti reports in the Idaho  Emmett Messenger-Index, "I figured that using my opinion would be the best way to deal with this assignment. As many of you know, I’ve been following the Idaho downwinders quite zealously over the last 15 months. I get regular emails from people all over the country who are telling me what’s going on in their neck of the woods. I’ve talked to representatives from Idaho’s delegation, who have pledged to recognize Idaho’s downwinders through national legislation. I’ve read obituaries, sent cards and attended funerals for some downwinders who couldn’t wait for the final call of the game. I have not heard from any of our state representatives on messages they plan to send to Washington D.C. on our behalf.
            "In spite of it all, I’m still hopeful our federal government will do the right thing. However, my very impatient side keeps asking: “When?” “How much longer?”
            "Downwinders received their first, real recognition from Utah’s Senator Oren Hatch. He did a marvelous job a few years ago getting both recognition and compensation for Utah’s downwinders - downwinders who were hit gentler than most of Idaho’s. But, recently, his voice has grown still.. I’m not too disheartened as his cohort, Senator Jim Matheson, has taken up the torch, so Utah is still in the battle.
            "However, just like in 1997 when a report from the National Cancer Institute revealed Idaho was one of the hardest hit states (with four of the most heavily dusted counties) from nuclear fallout, I haven’t heard from most of our delegation on what they’re doing. Granted, there is a lot of work going on in Washington, DC, with the war, hurricane and Supreme Court judges. But life is full of distractions which will only distract one as much as you let it.
            "I do know that Senator Mike Crapo has introduced legislation to acknowledge Idahoans now. Kudos to you Mike! I’ve been told you are slowly chipping away at things. And, I certainly hope that you won’t let up and will up the ante soon.
            "I have been told that Senator Crapo is working on several fronts behind the scenes for downwinders. He’s written to both the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (the committee that’s in the middle of the judge appointments) as well as the US Dept. of Health and Human Services. He spoke of the inequity that Idahoans are not compensated while those in other states who received much less exposure are compensated. He asks for immediate inclusion of all Idaho in RECA (Radiation Exposure Compensation Act).
            "Senator Crapo has also been working with Senator Conrad Burns from Montana. Senator Burns has introduced his own legislation for those from Montana to be included in RECA. (Montana was also hit hard, in fact, according to the NCI report, the hardest hit area in the country was in Montana, just over Idaho’s border.)
Senator Crapo has talked with Senator Hatch as well.  Combined forces make for a strong offense.
            "But, Senator Crapo, what are Senator Larry Craig and Congressmen Butch Otter and Mike Simpson or Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne doing to help your cause? Questions I’ve asked and haven’t been given a reply.  Gem County, you need to help me by putting pressure on these gentlemen to follow through with their promises. Otherwise, it’s just words in the wind-of no importance, not even to the birds."

            Brett Wilkison reports in High Country News 2/20/06 that "Almost all of the 140 million Americans alive during the nuclear bomb tests of the 1950s were exposed, in some degree, to radioactive fallout. Thirty million have died or are expected to die of cancer. Yet only a tiny fraction of those cases — no more than 16,000 — can be attributed to nuclear fallout, say three researchers from the National Cancer Institute in a study published in January.
            "That estimate is low, say some fallout victims’ advocates. They worry that the study lends support to a recommendation that would significantly decrease the number of downwinders covered by a federal compensation program.
            "The study follows a 2005 National Academy of Sciences report that recommended scrapping the geography-based standards of the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA). That 1990 law provides payments to downwinders suffering from certain cancers who lived in parts of Nevada, Arizona and Utah during the tests. The Academy report said radioactive fallout was likely not a "substantial contributing cause of cancer," and it recommended compensation be based on medical evidence instead of location.
            "Yet it’s difficult to prove that fallout exposure caused a given case of cancer, downwinders say, and developing new compensation standards could take years. The government might as well say there is not going to be any more compensation, says Tona Henderson, an activist in Emmett, Idaho, who has lost 10 family members to cancers she believes were induced by fallout.
            "While Congress debates how to change RECA, Sen. Mike Crapo., R-Idaho, Sen. Larry Craig, R-Idaho, and Sen. Conrad Burns, R-Mont., introduced legislation in December to extend compensation to their states, which have counties that were among the hardest hit by fallout. Downwinders suffering from cancer are running out of time, says Henderson: They should include us in RECA now and study us later."

            Joe Bauman reports in Deseret Morning News 2/15/06, "The Centers for Disease Control has posted its final report on the feasibility of studying health problems caused by fallout — about eight years after Congress requested it.  The report refers approvingly to a study that Dr. Joseph Lyon of the University of Utah was conducting related to the connection between thyroid abnormalities and fallout, believed to be the most widespread harm caused by the radioactive particles. However, the CDC killed Lyon's study last March after $8 million was spent on it.
      "Lyon estimated his study was about two-thirds completed.  'We should be doing that study,' he said Tuesday. 'The CDC shut us down and told us it was a waste of their money and time.' He added, 'The CDC doesn't have a clue.'
      "Congress requested the feasibility report in 1998. In 2002 a draft was forwarded to the National Academy of Sciences for comment. The final version was ready in April 2005, and transmitted to Congress in February 2006, says a CDC summary posted on the Internet.

      "A government spokeswoman said the report was made public on Jan. 25, when delivered to Congress. (The CDC's posted statement says it was transmitted to Congress in February). It was posted on the Internet on Friday, she said. The final report concludes that a detailed study of the health impacts on Americans because of fallout 'is technically possible.' It adds that this would require 'significant resources' and that 'careful considerations should be given to public health priorities before this path is taken.'
      "In other words, the report says an agency considering such a study should carefully weigh priorities. The report says the harm from fallout is 'small' but that is a relative term, based on the astronomical number of cancer injury and deaths not caused by fallout. It notes that the National Cancer Institute said in a 1997 study that between 11,300 and 212,000 thyroid cancers would be expected among the U.S. population because of Nevada Test Site fallout. Thyroid cancer is rarely fatal.
      "The latest report estimates that about 11,000 "extra cancer deaths from all cancers, including leukemia, would be predicted to occur among the population of the United States alive at any time during the years 1951-2000 as a result of external exposure to fallout."
      "When non-fatal cancers are included, the number of cases double to 22,000, it says. That is a relatively small number compared with the millions of cases that harm Americans.  The most heavily impacted by fallout are the 3.8 million Americans born in 1951, because that group had higher doses at younger ages than others. Fallout is expected to cause "fewer than 1,000 extra fatal cancers" among them. By comparison, for people born in 1951, about 760,000 fatal cancers could be expected if there were no fallout.  For the figures cited, only "crude estimates" are available, the report says.  "Any person living in the contiguous United States since 1951 has been exposed to radioactive fallout, and all organs and tissues of the body have received some radiation exposure," the final report says. About 100 nuclear bombs were detonated above ground at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s and '60s.
      "The new report notes that fallout deposition maps are available, and a detailed study of health impacts is technically possible.  In spite of the large uncertainties, it is likely that there is an increased risk of cancer from fallout, but it is also highly likely that this increase is very small relative to the usual risk of cancer in the absence of fallout exposure, it says. In the conclusion, the report says the Institute of Medicine, part of the National Academy of Sciences, could help to clarify the extent to which the Nevada tests increased the incidence of thyroid cancer.
      "The University of Utah is currently extending the follow-up for a previous epidemiological study of children who lived in the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s; the results are expected to be available in a few years," the conclusion adds.
      "Outcomes evaluated will include neoplastic (that is, with tumors, as in cancer) and non-neoplastic thyroid disease.  However, that study was cancelled by CDC shortly before the present final report was completed.  "Obviously, the Institute of Medicine must disagree with the leadership of the CDC" about the value of his study, Lyon said.  He said he still believes the study should be completed. "There's quite a bit to be learned."
      "Other studies have indicated that only about half of the fatal cancers caused by fallout have taken their toll, because of the latency period after exposure.  Preston Truman, director of the group Downwinders — a resident of Malad, Idaho, and a former resident of southern Utah — said he is amazed by the lack of attention paid to Lyon's study. After it was cancelled, "the politicians never really applied the pressure they could have, and should have when the results on thyroiditis began to come in." Thyroiditis is an inflammation of the thyroid gland that may be tied to fallout, but is not a form of cancer.  Truman called for a fallout study to generate answers to questions that persist."